Tawfik Ali

Bid sheet, corrected from Answer sheet

TAWFIKALIABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

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0DirectionsRead before you begin

Every bidder was a student first. Even the AI agents that bid for us learn from how we did in school. I work on both ends: learning and markets.

Example
Follow Maya: a student, then a worker, then a bidder.

The work

  1. 1. A-Warded: I co-founded A-Warded with friends I've known since middle school. (A-Warded · Doha · 2025 to now)
  2. 2. Study rooms: We built study rooms where a whole group talks to one AI tutor. (A-Warded · Aila)
  3. 3. Open Book: I launched Open Book, a free library with 3,500 weekly users. (A-Warded · Open Book)
  4. 4. The matching engine: I built a job-matching engine for QRDI, on deferred acceptance. (QRDI talent-retention project · lead engineer)
  5. 5. The Vickrey engine: I implemented the Vickrey auction engine for the GCC's proposed carbon market. (ETS-GCC · Qatar University · 2024 to now)
2Study roomsScripted demo

One tutor. The whole room.

Anyone in the room can ask Aila. It answers everyone.

Group work

4 people and Aila

    Aila is listening to everyone
    3ResearchShow your work

    Three papers and a question. Play with each one.

    1Revise & resubmit · Mathematical Social Sciences

    The Price of Decentralized Matching

    Tawfik Ali and Mustafa Oguz Afacan (MBZUAI, Sabancı University)

    When should a job market stop hiring on its own and use a clearinghouse? Count the crossings.

    Abstract

    In a benchmark market in which all workers agree on how to rank vacancies and all vacancies agree on how to rank workers, decentralized hiring need not follow those rankings. We ask when a centralized clearinghouse that collects participants' rankings and assigns the matches should replace decentralized hiring. One rule values blocking pairs (a worker and vacancy who prefer each other to their assigned partners), while another values the resulting loss in total match output, which we call surplus.

    Below a critical cost per position, each rule centralizes at and above a threshold size. Expected surplus loss per expected blocking pair links the rules and rises with randomness in hiring. We prove that the first rule is unchanged on a class of preferences differing on both sides. The surplus loss formula is due to Mallows (1957).

    Draft on request
    workersvacanciesbestbest
    Blocking pairs
    11
    Expected
    12.7
    Surplus lost
    24

    A crossing is a blocking pair. Expected: nq/(1−q) − Σ iqⁱ/(1−qⁱ).

    Fig. 2Each red dot: a worker and a job who'd rather have each other.
    2Under review · Climate Policy

    Conditional Insurance against Collusion in the Carbon Market

    Tawfik Ali and Mustafa O. Afacan

    Carbon auctions charge every winner one price, and bidder rings can hold. Vickrey payments are cheap insurance.

    Summary

    The EU ETS, RGGI and California sell allowances by sealed-bid, uniform-price auction. Swapping only the payment rule to Vickrey makes truthful bidding a dominant strategy; the bids stay the same.

    In the calibration, a sustained ring under uniform pricing clears at the floor and destroys 17 to 21% of per-auction welfare. Vickrey's exposure is about a tenth of that, and it becomes welfare-superior once sustained collusion is more than a few percent likely.

    Draft on request
    flooruniform price $30$52you$46A$40you$38B$30C$12A$11B4 allowances

    Uniform price (today)

    $32

    Your profit · revenue $120

    You win 2, pay $60

    Same as bidding your true value.

    Vickrey (proposed)

    $50

    Your profit · revenue $102

    You win 2, pay $42

    Same as bidding your true value.

    Uniform: every winner pays the highest losing bid. Vickrey: each unit pays the bid it pushes out.

    Fig. 3Same bids, two payment rules.
    3NAACL 2025 · Student Research Workshop

    Exploring Taxonomic Emotion Detection via Saliency Mapping and Large Language Model Context Generation

    Tawfik Ali, Ala Omidfar, Sai Phalguna, Raaneya Dehlavi, Kevin Zhu, Aslihan Akalin, Sean O'Brien

    Give a model the backstory and it reads the feeling better.

    Abstract

    Detecting human emotions is a complex process often restricted by predetermined emotion labels, limiting the ability of systems to recognize nuanced or novel emotional expressions. To overcome this constraint, we explore a generative approach that uses large language models (LLMs) context creation and analyze the results with the usage of saliency maps. Instead of relying solely on static sample texts, our method generates dynamic backstories that provide additional context for understanding emotions in text or speech, and these backstories improved our evaluations. This novel framework re-imagines emotion detection as a context-driven process, which in turn enables systems to "see the bigger picture" and make more informed and accurate predictions based on added adjectives, nouns, and punctuation.

    Read the paper (PDF)
    1. Sample

      “The sun is shining.”

    2. GPT-4o writes a backstory

      Waiting

      Context, e.g. “It is my birthday today.”

    3. DistilBERT reads it

      hard to read alone

    Five passes. The paper’s own example: a birthday turns sunshine into excitement.

    Which words said “anger”

    PeopledeletingandstopcaringISTHEREASONwhyartifactisunder2kplayers

    Anger confidencehigh

    Take out the brightest words and the confidence collapses.

    precision (vs 0.40)
    0.60
    precision (vs 0.40)
    accuracy
    79.10%
    accuracy
    macro F1
    0.58
    macro F1
    saliency on “!”
    1.00
    saliency on “!”
    Fig. 4GPT-4o writes the backstory; DistilBERT reads the emotion.
    4Exploring · not started

    Self-healing AI bidders

    Can an AI bidder fix its own bad bids without learning to collude?

    bidregretdetectdiagnoserepairABon its own

    Two AI bidders that repair their own bids. Publish every result, and do they fall into step?

    FloorPrice
    Fig. 5A sketch of the question, not a result.
    4ScoresScore report
    SAT Math
    800
    of 18,000+ teams, IMC Prosperity
    140th
    World Mathematics Team Championship
    Bronze
    Ethics reviewer
    NeurIPS

    Off the clock, I play poker with my co-founders.

    Turn the card over

    5Hand in

    Pencils down. Paddles up.

    Investors, professors, builders.

    tawfik@stanford.edu
    LinkedInGitHub